Dienstag, 12. Juli 2016

Violence and the Neoliberal Governing of the ‘Unwanted’: The Case of Serbian Asylum Seekers in Germany



Jelena Jovičić

Since 2011, Germany, along with other European countries, has borne witness to numerous exchanges, challenges and changes to discourses surrounding the refugee debate (or, popularly, the ‘refugee crisis’). While a part of civil society has been enormously engaged in and has stood in solidarity with those seeking protection in Germany, xenophobic messages, anti-immigrant rallies, and attacks on refugee accommodations have gained considerable public attention as well. Despite the view that Germany has shown great generosity when it comes to granting protection to asylum seekers, research on refugees points to an overall growth of restrictions and actual shrinkage of asylum claiming rights (Bosswick, 2000). While the general terms for being granted refugee status are somewhat sacredly set by the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (i.e. Geneva) and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, national governments have been highly involved in re-negotiating these terms.
In Germany, the political debate has included a series of discussions and changes in discourse, mostly towards the tightening of the rules surrounding the rights to asylum. The post-World War II political climate in Germany engendered a short, but progressive debate on the issue of asylum; much has happened since. Successive influxes of refugees into Germany were followed by political discussions that contributed to the tightening of the rights to asylum. Examples include refugees fleeing the military coup in Turkey during the 1980s, and administrative changes which included the acceleration of procedures diminishing the right to appeals, mobility restrictions of rejected asylum seekers, and temporary bans on work rights for asylum seekers (Bosswick, 2000). The years to follow were marked by the emergence of discourses—especially in conservative political circles—surrounding so-called ‘economic refugees’ (German: Wirtschaftsflüchtlinge) and corresponding institutional reactions towards the criminalization of asylum. The latter was reflected in the popular idea that asylum seekers are not all ‘genuine’ victims, but that ‘bogus economic refugees’  were trying to abuse the generous social system in Germany, and were thereby abusing the asylum system (German: Asylmiβbrauch). After a series of right wing extremist violence reflected targeted attacks on people with a migration background and asylum seekers, the dominant discourse became one of emergency. This new discourse is reflected in the restrictions on asylum claims for those who passed through a safe state on their way to Germany, especially if they came from a ‘non-persecuting state’. Under modern asylum law terminology, these are the roots of the ‘safe third country’[1] and the ‘safe country of origin’[2] rules (BMJV, 2015).
It is the concept of the ‘safe country of origin’ (SCO) that I pay special attention to in this paper. Defined in the German Basic Law as the practice whereby states may be specified in which, on the basis of their laws, enforcement practices and general political conditions, it can be safely concluded that neither political persecution nor inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment exists(Deutscher Bundestag, 2012)[3]. The policy aims at speeding up and deterring further asylum claims from countries where persecution on any grounds generally does not exist. This homogenizing assumption of safety for all has been challenged both by experts and researchers (Engelmann, 2014; Hunt, 2014). The German Asylum Act (German: Asylgesetz) currently lists Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ghana, Kosovo, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Senegal and Serbia as ‘safe’. As a part of Asylum Package II (German: Asylpaket II), the German Parliament agreed that, in 2016, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia will be added to the SCO list. These legal changes have been followed by a revival of discourses regarding the genuineness of refugees and asylum seekers. The underlying assumption is a binary distinction between the ‘genuine refugee’ as a passive victim, in contrast to the ‘bogus’ ‘economic refugee’, the one actively using his/her agency to profit from the generous social system in Germany. What remains unseen are a myriad of different experiences driven by prolonged political and institutional maltreatment, often exceptional poverty, and, most importantly, motivation for status and recognition (perhaps even exceptionality). In this paper I try to contrast the dominant understanding, accompanied by policy and legal changes, by providing direct insights from a field study done with Serbian asylum seekers in Berlin, Germany. In  doing so, I aim to acquire a better understanding of how neoliberal governing of ‘unwanted’ migration is seen from the perspective of asylum seekers from Serbia. 
Literature Review
Research linking neoliberal subjectivity and the portrayal of refugees and asylum seekers is somewhat plentiful and complex. To assume there exists a neoliberal governmentality in the realm of peoples’ movement, one needs to identify the problem and also the multiplicity of governmentalities involved in the process of governing irregular migration. The ‘bogus asylum problem’ is not a natural process, but one imposed and directed towards certain groups which are identified as incompatible or undesired in the economical context of a nation state. De Genova explains the discursive practices behind what he calls the border spectacle”—or the spectacle that presents the migrant ‘illegally’ as spectacularly visible (2013, p. 1181). The spectacle creates a new kind of migrant subject: the ‘unwanted or undesirable’ who is stigmatized for being opportunistic and profit-maximizing. These discourses are complex and emerge as a combination of  language and image, of rhetoric, text and subtext, accusation and insinuation, as well as the visual grammar that upholds and enhances the iconicity of particular fetishized figures of ‘illegal immigration’”(De Genova, 2013, p. 1181). Relevant for this research project, De Genova relates his understanding of the illegality as enabled by a large body of law and policy which enables the conditions for a migration regime that governs and labels subjects as ‘illegal’. It is argued that state power has grown to rely on the quick and shallow proliferation of mass-media discourses and imagery.
Relatedly, through a discourse analysis which traces the emergence of ‘asylum shopping’, Moore (2013) investigated how this term was constructed as a part of coverage of the news narratives of ‘common EU asylum policy’ and the European fingerprint database for identifying asylum seekers and irregular border-crossers (Eurodac[4]). Moore argues that in neoliberal capitalism, where social assistance, job security, and the general belief in precariousness are shrinking, groups such as asylum seekers are assessed through the filter of a neoliberal discourse on entrepreneurship (2013). Namely, they are portrayed as responsible and active agents who chose a destination country with the end goal of maximizing their profits when securing their asylum. In this case study, they chose the UK due to their belief that they will receive better treatment. This term is normalized by combining a common market-related consumerist term – ‘shopping’ with a term used for seeking protection – ‘asylum seeking’. Similarly, Threadgold (2006) explains why those same negative media narratives are so hard to combat since they embed a strong focus on the asylum seeker as the neoliberal subject, a consumer who is responsible for her/his own situation, independent of what might have been the historical context of their lives (Threadgold, 2006). In this way, the idea that it is government’s responsibility to ‘filter out’ the ‘genuine refugees’ from the crowds of the other types of migrants who seek to obtain their profits emerges. In order to do so, governments must create conditions and develop systems for effective processing, which are often inseparable from gendered, classist and racist practices.
In order to rationalize and explain the problematics of certain types of migration, the governments and policy makers first need to name the ‘problem’. This is done though an invention of labels, leading to the fractioning of terms such as ‘migrant’ or ‘refugee’ into new subcategories. Kmak (2015) explains the role of law and surrounding discourses in establishing the rational, moral neoliberal subject who represents the EU citizen, encouraged to use his/her mobility as a given. This is contrasted, on the other hand, with the economically inactive asylum seeker as the immoral subject who is normalized through the recourse to the concept of bogus asylum seeker” (Kmak, 2015, p. 398). Moreover, Zetter (2007) explains the gradual response of national governments who relabeled the normative conditions of refugee status determination” by uniting certain asylum and immigration policies at the level of the EU (e.g. Dublin Regulations). The policies set up to ‘filter out’ the ‘bogus asylum seekers’ and other migrants also greatly restrict the general possibilities of entry, despite the fact that asylum can only be claimed once on the territory of the country in question. In the light of the raised numbers of asylum applications, the term ‘refugee’ has been increasingly contrasted with that of the ‘economic migrant’ or the ‘bogus asylum seeker’. It is in the states’ interest, Zetter argues, to create new labels for what it itself is unable to manage: the very complex root causes behind why people to flee, such as the mixture of persecution and socio-economic exclusionary practices (2007, p. 183).
Labels replicate the professional, bureaucratic and political values which create them” (Zetter, 1991, p. 44). Knowing this makes the examination of the impact of the labels such as the ‘asylum shopper’ or the ‘bogus refugee’ essential, given the neoliberal context. The administrative labeling of refugees and asylum seekers can come with serious consequences. Sigona (2003) explains the role that ethnicity plays in shaping identity discourses according to the administrative ‘reception’ in the country of asylum. For example, Roma asylum seekers in Italy are frequently referred to as ‘nomads’, a label which incites suspicion of the how can a ‘nomad’ be a ‘refugee’?” variety (Sigona, 2003, p. 70). Consequently, the labeling can skew the understanding of the greater society for whom the subject in question is (e.g. a ‘genuine’ or ‘economic’ refugee): “[…] once they define a group of people as a community and consequently allocate resources to them, they actually create a community: from those labelled ‘nomads’ to nomads” (2003, p. 70). With this in mind, I now introduce the empirical part of this research project.
Methodology
This study was fully conducted in Berlin, Germany. In this study most of the data was gathered inside so-called emergency accommodation (German: Flüchtlingsheim): in participants’ rooms, and during their visits to relevant asylum-claiming administrational offices (e.g. LaGeSo). The participants in this study are two Serbian families who seek asylum in Germany (E., 32 and N., 39; J., 35 and P., 38). Both arrived in Berlin in August 2015 and were originally assigned to the same location in Berlin. I used theoretical sampling, whereby the suitability of participants was established prior to the selection and re-specified after the initial findings. I initially established contact with four families, out of which I lost contact with one family due to their deportation, and I excluded one family from further analysis because they had been living in Berlin for more than two years. The criteria was finally set as the following: a Serbian national, asylum seeker in Germany and residing in Berlin not longer than two years. I wanted to create a strong focus group based on the nationality of the asylum seeker, host country and finally place emphasis on the period of the arrival, which is a time when many administrational hurdles start to evolve. The empirical data for this study was collected through a series of semi-structured and unstructured interviews and participant observation. All interviews were conducted in Serbian—the mother tongue of all participants. I refrained from using voice or video recording due to the ethical issues of revealing asylum seekers’ identities. I wrote down notes right after our meetings, and always completed the full transcript on the same day of the interview. All transcripts were immediately translated from Serbian and written down in English. For the purpose of data analysis I made use of the QDA miner Lite[5] software, downloadable freeware for storing and analyzing qualitative data such as interview transcripts.
Summary of the Main Findings
The inner entrepreneur? The ‘economic refugee’ with no profit in sight
As supported by literature on neoliberal subjectivities, the creation of the market-like society takes place while competition, self-government and entrepreneurship become integral parts of individuals’ lives. In relation to governing refugee lives, we see a fractioning of the label ‘refugee’ into at least two categories, those being the ‘genuine’ and ‘vulnerable’ refugee in need of protection, and the ‘bogus’, profit-maximizing ‘economic refugee’—disguised as an asylum seeker. Law, policy, and the media all intertwine to categorize certain groups, including Serbian asylum seekers, as the latter (De Genova, 2013; Moore, 2013; Threadgold, 2006; Zetter, 2007). The question remains, in the perception of my interviewees, is there anything entrepreneurial about seeking asylum in Germany?
Data shows that, closest to being entrepreneurial, is something that comes down to expressing a wish to find a job in Germany. P. explains that his business failed in Serbia but that he possesses skills which he sees as applicable in Germany. However, he also understands that he is not allowed to be a fair competitor in his current condition. He explains: there are people around here, they asked me to pick up their junk, there are a lot of different things to do and be repaired, but how can I do this when I don't have anything else, I would bring the stuff to the Heim (translation: the accommodation center) and the security would ask me what are you doing carrying that stuff in here. And even if I could, how would I explain it to him, we don't speak the same language”. Relatedly, when inquiring why there were many people from Serbia seeking asylum, the explanation was often the inability to find or maintain a job which can support a family back home. When inquired what is it that works towards getting an asylum claim approved, N. remarkedWell it depends on if the thing you have to offer is wanted. Therefore you (the researcher) are in a different situation”. My interviewee has a clear picture of who is pulled in and given the right to mobility and who is out (Kmak, 2015). Regardless of the fact that we both hold Serbian passports, he made the boundary between us clear: it is the education, the skills one has to offer which are wanted. He moved on to saying they (Germans) like the best of the best. It is like when the Americans and Russian took the greatest minds from Germany during the wars. Germany is a powerful country and they can do as they like. And so they decide who they want. If one of my children could work as something really special, like music or languages all of this would have been easier.” This perception emphasizes that Germany is a country that decides what is needed to keep the market competitive and effective by selecting who is in and who is out. In this way, Germany is reimagining itself as the powerful country” (N. Int. 2, Line 68). Whereas they themselves are the best examples of the involvement of state power in setting rules for wanted/unwanted dichotomies, they nevertheless understand such practices as natural, understandable and at times admirable.
The discourses of the economic gains of SCO asylum seekers are hardly visible. The findings mostly point to the highly subjective nature of what poverty is and what there is to be ‘gained’ though the experience of asylum. What adds to the complexity is my interviewees’ understanding of what is the gain of being in Germany in relation to other Serbian asylum seekers. For example, E. once explained some people have been here for a year, transferred from one Heim to another, to a camp and so on. And one man says he loves it, he has his room now and a TV and he is happy. People are happy to have a roof over their heads and that's it”. She continues the other woman here, from Bosnia, she used to sublet a place back home, so not paying stuff here seems great to her. But this is not life. You sit in a room all day doing nothing, that’s just crazy.” What she offers, in contrast, is explaining her own situation back home:but back home we had jobs, a house, my cousin is really rich and whenever I couldn’t make the ends meet, I’d ask her for help”. While positioning herself as different from the other SCO asylum seekers in regards to the gains of being in Germany, she simultaneously points to the hardship of her condition back home, such as occasionally not making ends meet. Relating back to the idea of maximizing  profit though asylum, we need to comprehend that poverty is a relative term which is often charged with a Western understanding of life quality and status.
The ‘Azilant’ – a Label that Remains
To be a refugee but also a neoliberal subject is presented as immoral, in line with Kmak (2015), under the current refugee regime in Germany. This distinction is internalized and evident for my interviewees, who never regarded themselves as refugees but as Asylants (Serbian: azilant). This is a derogatory term for asylum seekers in Germany. In several instances, being in Germany was describes as coming on Asylum” (Serbian: doći na azil). It is used to express what our people” (E., Int.1, Line 101)—generally referred to as people who speak a language common to Serbia—do in Germany. This finding is also interesting because of the construction of this expression, which insinuates sitting on something or making use of something. Moreover, the so called ‘economic refugees’ from SCO are targeted for accelerated procedures which aim at enabling quick identification of their assumed ‘bogus’ applications and effective removal upon rejection. The data points to clear expectations of such outcomes, namely the understanding of their conditions as short-term in nature, with a certain end in the future. This corresponds to the current policy practices of accelerating procedures for those applications considered as ‘unfounded’ under the current refugee regime in Germany. E. often referred to a point of departure embedded in her status as an asylum seeker from Serbia by saying everybody leaves in the end”. To be an ‘azilant’ is also understood as something violent, a prolonged experience, and a label which will remain once they are back in Serbia. A great deal of codes are wrapped around leaving”, or the expression of the urge to go back but also fearing to do so. Relevantly, E. explains how she needs to make sure to buy her kids good things such as smartphones while in Germany, especially the oldest daughter, since she understands the most. This way she hopes to prepare them for the stigma which awaits them once they are sent back to Serbia, as they will be the labelled as the ‘azilant kids’. This all points to the fact that the negative images surrounding them in Germany are expected to be a prolonged experience. This finding is in line with Sigona (2003) who explains the enduring and harmful nature of administrational labeling. To fight this image, E. equips herself with symbols of good status, like the latest smartphones or a tablet she bought for the children to play with.
Bogus versus genuine’ refugee – a clear distinction or a permeable concept?
Field data points to a striking understanding of oneself in regards to other asylum seekers and refugees. There is a general mistrust in people surrounding them. The accommodation centers are often overcrowded and there is a lack of privacy. People report being unable to lock the doors at night, and feeling unsafe despite the presence of security guards at all times. Feelings of mistrust are manifested through the expression of concern about scarce resources. For example, E. reports that she is overwhelmed with others snatching like animals” or grabbing out of my hands” basics such as food and cosmetics. She never leaves anything lying out of her sight because it would just be gone”.
The mention of people’s nationality plays a role when referring to the other asylum seekers. Mistrust in their origin was expressed in several instances. For example, when explaining with whom she fights for food, she refers to a woman from Libya or Palestine, who would know, she says Libya but her papers say Palestine.” In another instance E. shares her story about a Serbian man who speaks Arabic, was a doctor in Syria and fled to Germany with a group of Syrians. He won’t speak a word of Serbian you know. But I know he can. Once we were alone and we spoke, he can do it. I don't want to make him trouble you know, so I only talk to him when there are no people around.” Hereby, E. identifies the perceived advantages of belonging to a certain language group or nationality. There is an advantage of being Syrian in regards to the asylum application which, in this case, helps the Serbian man and E. does not want to hinder this.
A related finding is what I call ‘flexible identities’. This is reflected in the internalization of dominant discourses surrounding asylum seekers from ‘safe countries of origin’, as the ones who are not in real need of protection, and therefore are not ‘genuine’ but refugees. In that sense, J. explains:we are Roma, we have nothing back home […] I know there are people who escaped the war here, people who saw horrible things. They probably need help more than we do. We know how it is to be in a country where there is war. But Serbia is so bad for people like us, it’s almost like war. We have nothing there, so we leave”. The way my interviewees draw lines between themselves, on the one hand, and the ‘refugees’—or the people from countries where there is war—is also manifested while assuming a personal identity in a flexible manner. As a response to being labelled ‘bogus’, they reinforce what a refugee label insinuates as a possible reasons of persecution (e.g. religious or ethnic minorities). They use the ‘minority’ identity when referring to their asylum claims. For example, once I asked P. and N. why Serbian asylum seekers come to Germany. P. replied,we are not Serbians, I am Roma and he is a Muslim”. In another instance, when E. started wearing a headscarf, P. asked her why are you wearing that thing, you are one of us, a Serbian”. Therefore, the ‘minority’ identity is most relevant in relation to their asylum claims—possibly as a struggle to conform to what is regarded as a ‘genuine’ refugee. This further points to oversimplified ways in which the SCO policy targets whole groups of asylum seekers based on their nationality. From the findings it is clear that my interviewees (rightfully so) re-emphasize their minority identities, such as ethnicity or religion, whereas at other times being Serbian is emphasized as uniting. Importantly, these processes should not be seen as sneaky tricks or a game. These are strong responses in reaction to the institutional identities which are set and reinforced by multiple actors of a refugee regime, such as the case of ‘transit migrants’ in the sense of Hess (2012) and Tsianos and Karakayali (2010).
The unseen: unique flight experiences and status regaining
To assume that looking for economically gainful experiences is the single reason for seeking asylum in Germany is, I argue, misleading and simply incorrect. It may appear so on the surface, but it does not take much digging to uncover a whole series of intersecting struggles experienced before the decision to flee. One example is the reality of living in Serbia as an ethnic minority, let us say as a Roma Serbian person—faced with discrimination on every level of existence. For example, J. explains:I am a Roma, it all started in the school. Kids pick on you, molest you, they don’t like us there. So I dropped school early.” Roma people are deprived of school education in Serbia, despite the popular understanding backed by the stereotypical, racist views that schooling is not for them, or that Roma parents use children to work for them. It is, in fact, at the level of institutional discrimination where it all begins. Relatedly, P. explains:they would only give me a seasonal job […] Nobody ever hires a Gypsy for long term”. Labour market discrimination is an ongoing problem. In a similar vein, N. talks about his job in Serbia depending on who they vote for in the local elections : if you are voting for Rasim, then you have a job”. Party membership and affiliation remains a crucial step to employment for many, especially in the regions where poverty and job scarcity are higher. The concept of the neoliberal subject trying to maximize profit is profoundly incompatible to the project of understanding asylum seekers. Seeing them as savvy entrepreneurs” in the sense of Walters (2010), who strategically looks for ways to maximize profits through asylum seeking, does not take into account the complex questions of political and discriminatory constraints which bring people to flee.
Here is another argument: after the first analysis of the data, I noticed a high frequency of concepts relating to the shopping” behavior like the one surrounding the asylum seekers in the media (Moore, 2013; Threadgold, 2006). Money and commodities, living conditions, and the act of shopping for goods, were common topics brought up by my interviewees. The neoliberal standard, which was presented through an internalized intensity of the shopping experience in Germany, was striking. The idea is to purchase cheap goods for oneself, the family in Germany, and the one back in Serbia. E. explains that she sends several batches of different goods back to Serbia on monthly basis. She clarified:I went to the bus stop yesterday, I can even go alone now, I know it all. I’ve sent lots of clothes back home, and all kinds of things like pots, pans and toys for the kids. I bought those on action”. It’s so much cheaper, and the quality can’t be compared you know […] I couldn't find one like that back home. You see, I only wear the old clothes here, I send the good stuff back home. Why would I wear it here, who is here to see me?” E. emphasizes the need for recognizability, and despite the goods being attained, she situates this recognition back in Serbia. Moreover, E. suggests that quality in Germany is something exceptional which can be attained only there. However, she sends all goods back home, because to be exceptional is to bring back a piece of this status, of being in a Western, ‘powerful’ country. In the Heim as she puts it, there is nobody to see her. Why would such a finding be of importance? Because, I argue, asylum seekers are not neoliberal subjects, aiming at maximizing their profits, despite the consumer behavior shown here. It is their status in relation to their home country which they try to re-establish ever so strongly.
Why is this relevant?
The topics revolving around refugees have been highly debated in Germany in 2015. As one of the largest recipient countries in European Union, Germany has been regarded as generous when it comes to refugee intake. Simultaneously, however, a series of discourse shifts have been witnessed, followed by strict amendments regarding asylum rights. Restricting practices are central to the debates on the ‘refugee crisis’. The need to combat ‘economic refugee’ influxes so that ‘genuine’ refugees would be better served represents one of the current dominating discourses. Under the SCO policy, refugees’ and asylum seekers’ lives are placed under a homogenized arch of the ‘deemed as unwanted’, backed by the media and governmental discourses on their profit-maximizing aims. The simplicity and thereby danger of the SCO policy lies behind the understanding that certain countries cannot ‘produce’ refugees, and are therefore ‘safe for all’. This enables the neoliberal understanding of whole groups as economic and rational players, however deemed unwanted under the current regime. Alongside this phenomenon, a lot remains unseen: the unique flight experiences of each individual, as well as their complex histories and backgrounds. Most importantly, their resistance against dominant discourses and administrational treatment brings forward the arena in which violence occurs.
Since some figures show that the number of applications has remained stable since the introduction of the SCO policy directed at asylum seekers from Western Balkan countries, there is a need to reconsider the usefulness and implications that SCO policy has brought. Most importantly, fieldwork studies conducted with refugees and asylum seekers have great potential to uncover the nuanced complexities embedded in the experiences of flight and refuge. This is a good way to create a pool of data and evidence pointing to the harmful and violent outcomes of the further fractioning of the term ‘refugee’ (Zetter, 2007). This is to say that criminalizing certain forms of migration often goes along with the idea of migrant agency or the deliberate power to move, cross borders and settle, such as in the case of ‘economic refugees’ (Tsianos and Karakayali, 2010). On the other hand, stripping off that same agency from those labelled as genuine refugees in need of protection is equally problematic and a burden that needs to be further explored in this context. Based on the presented findings, the problem does not lie in the economically gainful experiences of asylum seekers and refugees. The problem lies in the ways in which the dominant understanding of who is deserving of help, protection and, most importantly, a right to seek a good, dignified and prosperous future for oneself and/or her/his family is determined. This study modestly aims at contributing to a still scarce pool of empirical findings relating to the lives of SCO asylum seekers under the current refugee regime in Germany. Further research in this direction, especially that which would account for the roles that gender, race, sexual orientation and their intersections play, is of great potential and a necessity for both research knowledge, as well as for better, more humane policy measures of concern for asylum seekers, refugees, and their hosting societies.
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[1] Asylum Procedure Act, Section 29 Applications for asylum to be disregarded
[2] Asylum Procedure Act, Section 29a Safe country of origin
[3] Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany. Article 16a (3) – Rights of Asylum
[4]The Eurodac system enables European Union (EU) countries to help identify asylum applicants and persons who have been apprehended in connection with an irregular crossing of an external border of the Union. By comparing fingerprints, EU countries can determine whether an asylum applicant or a foreign national found illegally present within an EU country has previously claimed asylum in another EU country or whether an asylum applicant entered the Union territory unlawfully” (European Commission, 2000).



Author

Jelena
Jovičić, MA Social Sciences
 Bitte diesen Beitrag wie folgt zitieren: Jelena Jovičić (2016): Violence and the Neoliberal Governing of the ‘Unwanted’: The Case of Serbian Asylum Seekers in Germany. In: Gökce Yurdakul, Regina Römhild, Anja Schwanhäußer, Birgit zur Nieden, Aleksandra Lakic (Hg.): E-Book Project of Humboldt-University Students: Witnessing the Transition: Refugees, Asylum-Seekers and Migrants in Transnational Perspective. Preview (Weblog), https://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=863130166696833325#editor/target=post;postID=3697950972162993466;onPublishedMenu=allposts;onClosedMenu=allposts;postNum=0;src=link
  

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